Dear A,
here ya go..best j
Kohlberg's stages of moral development
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Kohlberg's stages of moral development are planes of moral adequacy conceived
by Lawrence Kohlberg to explain the development of moral reasoning. Created
while studying psychology at the University of Chicago, the theory was inspired
by the work of Jean Piaget and a fascination with children's reactions to moral
dilemmas.[1] He wrote his doctoral dissertation at the university in 1958,[2]
outlining what are now known as his stages of moral development.
His theory holds that moral reasoning, which is the basis for ethical behavior,
has six identifiable developmental constructive stages - each more adequate at
responding to moral dilemmas than the last.[3] In studying these, Kohlberg
followed the development of moral judgment far beyond the ages originally
studied earlier by Piaget,[4] who also claimed that logic and morality develop
through constructive stages.[3] Expanding considerably upon this groundwork, it
was determined that the process of moral development was principally concerned
with justice and that its development continued throughout the lifespan,[2]
even spawning dialogue of philosophical implications of such research.[5][6]
Kohlberg used stories about moral dilemmas in his studies, and was interested
in how people would justify their actions if they were put in a similar moral
crux. He would then categorize and classify evoked responses into one of six
distinct stages. These six stages are grouped into three levels:
pre-conventional, conventional and post-conventional.[7][8][9]
Contents [hide]
1 Stages
1.1 Pre-Conventional
1.2 Conventional
1.3 Post-Conventional
1.4 Further stages
2 Theoretical assumptions (philosophy)
2.1 Formal elements
3 Examples of applied moral dilemmas
3.1 Heinz dilemma
4 Criticisms
5 Continued relevance
6 See also
7 References
8 Further reading
9 External links
[edit]Stages
Kohlberg's six stages were grouped into three levels: pre-conventional,
conventional, and post-conventional.[7][8][9] Following Piaget's constructivist
requirements for a stage model (see his theory of cognitive development), it is
extremely rare to regress backward in stages - to lose functionality of higher
stage abilities.[10][11] Even so, no one functions at their highest stage at
all times.[citation needed] It is also not possible to 'jump' forward stages;
each stage provides a new yet necessary perspective, and is more comprehensive,
differentiated, and integrated than its predecessors.[10][11]
Level 1 (Pre-Conventional)
1. Obedience and punishment orientation
(How can I avoid punishment?)
2. Self-interest orientation
(What's in it for me?)
Level 2 (Conventional)
3. Interpersonal accord and conformity
(The good boy/good girl attitude)
4. Authority and social-order maintaining orientation
(Law and order morality)
Level 3 (Post-Conventional)
5. Social contract orientation
6. Universal ethical principles
(Principled conscience)
[edit]Pre-Conventional
The pre-conventional level of moral reasoning is especially common in children,
although adults can also exhibit this level of reasoning. Reasoners in the
pre-conventional level judge the morality of an action by its direct
consequences. The pre-conventional level consists of the first and second
stages of moral development, and are purely concerned with the self in an
egocentric manner.
In Stage one (obedience and punishment driven), individuals focus on the direct
consequences that their actions will have for themselves. For example, an
action is perceived as morally wrong if the person who commits it gets
punished. The worse the punishment for the act is, the more 'bad' the act is
perceived to be.[12] In addition, there is no recognition that others' points
of view are any different from one's own view.[citation needed] This stage may
be viewed as a kind of authoritarianism.[citation needed]
Stage two (self-interest driven) espouses the what's in it for me position,
right behavior being defined by what is in one's own best interest. Stage two
reasoning shows a limited interest in the needs of others, but only to a point
where it might further one's own interests, such as you scratch my back, and
I'll scratch yours.[3] In stage two concern for others is not based on loyalty
or intrinsic respect. Lacking a perspective of society in the pre-conventional
level, this should not be confused with social contract (stage five), as all
actions are performed to serve one's own needs or interests. For the stage two
theorist, the perspective of the world is often seen as morally relative.
[edit]Conventional
The conventional level of moral reasoning is typical of adolescents and adults.
Persons who reason in a conventional way judge the morality of actions by
comparing these actions to societal views and expectations. The conventional
level consists of the third and fourth stages of moral development.
In Stage three (interpersonal accord and conformity driven), the self enters
society by filling social roles. Individuals are receptive of approval or
disapproval from other people as it reflects society's accordance with the
perceived role. They try to be a good boy or good girl to live up to these
expectations,[3] having learned that there is inherent value in doing so. Stage
three reasoning may judge the morality of an action by evaluating its
consequences in terms of a person's relationships, which now begin to include
things like respect, gratitude and the 'golden rule'. Desire to maintain rules
and authority exists only to further support these stereotypical social roles.
The intentions of actions play a more significant role in reasoning at this
stage; 'they mean well...'[3]
In Stage four (authority and social order obedience driven), it is important to
obey laws, dictums and social conventions because of their importance in
maintaining a functioning society. Moral reasoning in stage four is thus beyond
the need for individual approval exhibited in stage three; society must learn
to transcend individual needs. A central ideal or ideals often prescribe what
is right and wrong, such as in the case of fundamentalism. If one person
violates a law, perhaps everyone would - thus there is an obligation and a duty
to uphold laws and rules. When someone does violate a law, it is morally wrong;
culpability is thus a significant factor in this stage as it separates the bad
domains from the good ones.
[edit]Post-Conventional
The post-conventional level, also known as the principled level, consists of
stages five and six of moral development. Realization that individuals are
separate entities from society now becomes salient. One's own perspective
should be viewed before the society's. It is due to this 'nature of self before
others' that the post-conventional level, especially stage six, is sometimes
mistaken for pre-conventional behaviors.
In Stage five (social contract driven), individuals are viewed as holding
different opinions and values. Along a similar vein, laws are regarded as
social contracts rather than rigid dictums. Those that do not promote the
general welfare should be changed when necessary to meet the greatest good for
the greatest number of people.[8] This is attained through majority decision,
and inevitably compromise. In this way democratic government is ostensibly
based on stage five reasoning.
In Stage six (universal ethical principles driven), moral reasoning is based on
abstract reasoning using universal ethical principles. Laws are valid only
insofar as they are grounded in justice, and that a commitment to justice
carries with it an obligation to disobey unjust laws. Rights are unnecessary as
social contracts are not essential for deontic moral action. Decisions are not
met hypothetically in a conditional way but rather categorically in an absolute
way (see Immanuel Kant's 'categorical imperative'[13]). This can be done by
imagining what one would do being in anyone's shoes, who imagined what anyone
would do thinking the same (see John Rawls's 'veil of ignorance'[14]). The
resulting consensus is the action taken. In this way action is never a means
but always an end in itself; one acts because it is right, and not because it
is instrumental, expected, legal or previously agreed upon. While Kohlberg
insisted that stage six exists, he had difficulty finding participants who
consistently used it. It appears that people rarely if ever reach stage six of
Kohlberg's model.[11]
[edit]Further stages
In his empirical studies of persons across their life-span, Kohlberg came to
notice that some people evidently had undergone moral stage regression. He was
faced with the option of either conceding that moral regression could occur, or
revising his theory. Kohlberg chose the latter, postulating the existence of
sub-stages wherein the emerging stage has not yet been adequately integrated
into the personality.[8] In particular Kohlberg noted of a stage 4½ or 4+,
which is a transition from stage four to stage five, sharing characteristics of
both.[8] In this stage the individual has become disaffected with the arbitrary
nature of law and order reasoning. Culpability is frequently turned from being
defined by society to having society itself be culpable. This stage is often
mistaken for the moral relativism of stage two as the individual views the
interests of society which conflict with their own choices as relatively and
morally wrong.[8] Kohlberg noted that this was often seen in students entering
college.[8][11]
Kohlberg further speculated that a seventh stage may exist (Transcendental
Morality or Morality of Cosmic Orientation) which would link religion with
moral reasoning[15] (see James W. Fowler's stages of faith
development[16][17]). However, because of Kohlberg's trouble providing
empirical evidence for even a sixth stage,[11] he emphasized that most of his
conjecture towards a seventh stage was theoretical.[5]
[edit]Theoretical assumptions (philosophy)
Kohlberg's theory is not value-neutral. It begins with a stake in certain
perspectives in meta-ethics. This includes for instance a view of human nature,
and a certain understanding of the form and content of moral reasoning. It
holds conceptions of the right and the scope of moral reasoning across
societies. Furthermore it includes the relationship between morality and the
world, between morality and logical expression, and the role of reason in
morality. Finally, it takes a view of the social and mental processes involved
in moral reasoning.
The picture of human nature which Kohlberg begins with is the view that humans
are inherently communicative and capable of reason as well as possessing a
desire to understand others and the world around them. The stages of Kohlberg's
model refer to the qualitative moral reasonings that people adopt, and thus do
not translate directly into praise or blame of the actions or characters of
persons. In order to argue that his theory measures moral reasoning and not
particular moral conclusions, Kohlberg insists that the form and structure of
moral arguments is independent of the content of the arguments, a position he
calls "formalism".[6][7]
Kohlberg's theory revolves around the notion that justice is the essential
feature of moral reasoning. By the same token, justice relies heavily upon the
notion of sound reasoning upon principles. Despite being a justice-centered
theory of morality, Kohlberg considered it to be compatible with plausible
formulations of deontology[13] and eudaimonia.
Kohlberg's theory understands values as a critical component of the right.
Whatever the right is, for Kohlberg, it must be universally valid across
societies (a position known as "moral universalism"[7]): there can be no
relativism. Moreover, morals are not natural features of the world; they are
prescriptive. Nevertheless, moral judgments can be evaluated in logical terms
of truth and falsity.
According to Kohlberg, a person who progresses to a higher stage of moral
reasoning cannot skip stages. For example, one cannot jump from being concerned
mostly with peer judgments (stage three) to being a proponent of social
contracts (stage five).[11] However, when one encounters a moral dilemma and
finds one's current level of moral reasoning unsatisfactory, one will look to
the next level. Discovery of the limitations of the current stage of thinking
drives moral development as each progressive stage is more adequate than the
last.[11] This process is constructive; it arises through the conscious
construction of the actor, and is neither in any meaningful sense a component
of the actor's innate dispositions, nor a result of past inductions.
[edit]Formal elements
Progress along the stages of development occurs because of the actor's
increased competence in both psychologically and socially balancing conflicting
value-claims. The name of "justice operation" is given to the process which
resolves the dispute between conflicting claims and strikes an equilibrium
between them. Kohlberg identifies two of these operations in "equality" and
"reciprocity", which respectively involve an impartial regard for persons
(i.e., irrespective of who the individual persons are), and a regard for the
role of personal merit. For Kohlberg, the most adequate result of both
operations is "reversibility", where a moral or dutiful act within a particular
situation is evaluated in terms of whether or not the act would be satisfactory
even if particular persons were to switch roles within the situation (also
known colloquially as "moral musical chairs").[6]
Knowledge and learning contribute to moral development. Specifically important
are the actor's view of persons and their social perspective level, each of
which becomes more complex and mature with each advancing stage. The view of
persons can be understood as the actor's grasp of the psychology of other
persons; it may be pictured as a spectrum, with stage one having no view of
other persons at all, and stage six being entirely sociocentric.[6] Similarly,
the social perspective level involves the understanding of the social universe,
differing from the view of persons in that it involves a grasp of norms.
[edit]Examples of applied moral dilemmas
Kohlberg established the Moral Judgement Interview in his original 1958
dissertation.[2] During the roughly 45 minute tape recorded semi-structured
interview, the interviewer uses moral dilemmas to determine which stage of
moral reasoning a person uses. The dilemmas are fictional short stories that
describe situations in which a person has to make a moral decision. The
participant is asked a systemic series of open-ended questions, like what they
think the right course of action is, as well as justifications as to why
certain actions are right or wrong. The form and structure of these replies are
scored and not the content; over a set of multiple moral dilemmas an overall
score is derived.[2][9]
[edit]Heinz dilemma
A dilemma that Kohlberg used in his original research was the druggist's
dilemma: Heinz Steals the Drug In Europe.[5]
A woman was near death from a special kind of cancer. There was one drug that
the doctors thought might save her. It was a form of radium that a druggist in
the same town had recently discovered. The drug was expensive to make, but the
druggist was charging ten times what the drug cost him to produce. He paid $200
for the radium and charged $2,000 for a small dose of the drug. The sick
woman's husband, Heinz, went to everyone he knew to borrow the money, but he
could only get together about $ 1,000, which is half of what it cost. He told
the druggist that his wife was dying and asked him to sell it cheaper or let
him pay later. But the druggist said, "No, I discovered the drug and I'm going
to make money from it." So Heinz got desperate and broke into the man's store
to steal the drug for his wife.
Should Heinz have broken into the laboratory to steal the drug for his wife?
Why or why not?[5]
From a theoretical point of view, it is not important what the participant
thinks that Heinz should do. Kohlberg's theory holds that the justification the
participant offers is what is significant, the form of their response.[7] Below
are some of many examples of possible arguments that belong to the six
stages:[5][12]
Stage one (obedience): Heinz should not steal the medicine because he will
consequently be put in prison which will mean he is a bad person. Or: Heinz
should steal the medicine because it is only worth $200 and not how much the
druggist wanted for it; Heinz had even offered to pay for it and was not
stealing anything else.
Stage two (self-interest): Heinz should steal the medicine because he will be
much happier if he saves his wife, even if he will have to serve a prison
sentence. Or: Heinz should not steal the medicine because prison is an awful
place, and he would probably languish over a jail cell more than his wife's
death.
Stage three (conformity): Heinz should steal the medicine because his wife
expects it; he wants to be a good husband. Or: Heinz should not steal the drug
because stealing is bad and he is not a criminal; he tried to do everything he
could without breaking the law, you cannot blame him.
Stage four (law-and-order): Heinz should not steal the medicine because the law
prohibits stealing, making it illegal. Or: Heinz should steal the drug for his
wife but also take the prescribed punishment for the crime as well as paying
the druggist what he is owed. Criminals cannot just run around without regard
for the law; actions have consequences.
Stage five (human rights): Heinz should steal the medicine because everyone has
a right to choose life, regardless of the law. Or: Heinz should not steal the
medicine because the scientist has a right to fair compensation. Even if his
wife is sick, it does not make his actions right.
Stage six (universal human ethics): Heinz should steal the medicine, because
saving a human life is a more fundamental value than the property rights of
another person. Or: Heinz should not steal the medicine, because others may
need the medicine just as badly, and their lives are equally significant.
[edit]Criticisms
One criticism of Kohlberg's theory is that it emphasizes justice to the
exclusion of other values. As a consequence of this, it may not adequately
address the arguments of people who value other moral aspects of actions. Carol
Gilligan has argued that Kohlberg's theory is overly androcentric.[18]
Kohlberg's theory was initially developed based on empirical research using
only male participants; Gilligan argued that it did not adequately describe the
concerns of women. Although research has generally found no significant pattern
of differences in moral development between sexes,[10][11] Gilligan's theory of
moral development does not focus on the value of justice. She developed an
alternative theory of moral reasoning that is based on the ethics of
caring.[18] Critics such as Christina Hoff-Sommers, however, argued that
Gilligan's research is ill-founded, and that no evidence exists to support her
conclusion.[19]
Other psychologists have questioned the assumption that moral action is
primarily reached by formal reasoning. One such group, the social
intuitionists, state people often make moral judgments without weighing
concerns such as fairness, law, human rights and abstract ethical values. Given
this, the arguments that Kohlberg and other rationalist psychologists have
analyzed could be considered post hoc rationalizations of intuitive decisions.
This would mean that moral reasoning is less relevant to moral action than
Kohlberg's theory suggests.
[edit]Continued relevance
Theory and research of Kohlberg's stages of moral development have been
utilized by others in academia. One such example, the Defining Issues Test or
DIT, was created by James Rest in 1979[20] originally as a pencil-and-paper
alternative to the Moral Judgement Interview.[21] Heavily influenced by the
six-stage model, it made efforts to improve validity criteria by using a
quantitative test of a likert scale to rate moral dilemmas similar to
Kohlberg's.[22] It also used a large body of Kohlbergian theory such as the
idea of 'post-conventional thinking'.[23][24] In 1999 the DIT was revised as
the DIT-2;[21] the test persists in many areas that require moral testing[25]
and in varied cohorts.[26][27][28]
[edit]See also
Jean Piaget, Theory of cognitive development
Carol Gilligan, Ethics of care
James W. Fowler, Stages of faith development
Jane Loevinger, Stages of ego development
Erik Erikson, Stages of psychosocial development
James Rest, Defining Issues Test
[edit]References
^ Crain, William C. (1985). Theories of Development, 2Rev Ed, Prentice-Hall.
ISBN 0-13-913617-7.
^ a b c d Kohlberg, Lawrence (1958). "The Development of Modes of Thinking and
Choices in Years 10 to 16". Ph. D. dissertation, University of Chicago.
^ a b c d e Kohlberg, Lawrence (1973). "The Claim to Moral Adequacy of a
Highest Stage of Moral Judgment". Journal of Philosophy 70: 630-646.
^ Piaget, Jean (1932). The Moral Judgment of the Child. London: Kegan Paul,
Trench, Trubner and Co.. ISBN 0-02-925240-7.
^ a b c d e Kohlberg, Lawrence (1981). Essays on Moral Development, Vol. I: The
Philosophy of Moral Development. Harper & Row. ISBN 0-06-064760-4.
^ a b c d Kohlberg, Lawrence; Charles Levine, Alexandra Hewer (1983). Moral
stages : a current formulation and a response to critics. Basel, NY: Karger.
ISBN 3-8055-3716-6.
^ a b c d e Kohlberg, Lawrence (1971). From Is to Ought: How to Commit the
Naturalistic Fallacy and Get Away with It in the Study of Moral Development.
Academic Press.
^ a b c d e f g Kohlberg, Lawrence; T. Lickona, ed. (1976). "Moral stages and
moralization: The cognitive-developmental approach", Moral Development and
Behavior: Theory, Research and Social Issues. Rinehart and Winston.
^ a b c Colby, Anne; Kohlberg, L. (1987). The Measurement of Moral Judgment
Vol. 2: Standard Issue Scoring Manual. Cambridge University Press. ISBN
0-521-24447-1.
^ a b c Walker, Lawrence, J. (February 1989). "A longitudinal study of moral
reasoning". Child Development 60 (1): 157-166.
^ a b c d e f g h Anne Colby; Gibbs, J. Lieberman, M., and Kohlberg, L. (1983).
A Longitudinal Study of Moral Judgment: A Monograph for the Society of Research
in Child Development. The University of Chicago Press. ISBN 99932-7-870-X.
^ a b Shaffer, David R. (2004). Social and Personality Development, 5th Ed,
Wadsworth Publishing. ISBN 0-534-60700-4.
^ a b Kant, Immanuel (1964). Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals. Harper and
Row Publishers, Inc. ISBN 0-06-131159-6.
^ * Rawls, John (1971). A Theory of Justice. Cambridge, MA: Belkap Press of
Harvard University Press. ISBN 0-674-01772-2.
^ Power, Clark; Lawrence Kohlberg, ed. (1981). "Moral Development, Religious
Thinking, and the Question of a Seventh Stage", Essays on Moral Development
Vol. I: Philosophy of Moral Development. San Francisco, CA: Harper & Row. ISBN
0-06-064760-4.
^ Fowler, John; T. Hennessey, ed. (1976). "Stages in Faith: The Structural
Developmental Approach", Values and Moral Development. New York: Paulist Press.
^ Fowler, John; S. Keen, ed. (1978). "Mapping Faith's Structures: A
Developmental View", Life Maps: Conversations on the Journey of Faith. Waco,
TX: Word Books. ISBN 0-8499-2848-6.
^ a b Gilligan, Carol (1977). "In a Different Voice: Women's Conceptions of
Self and Morality". Harvard Educational Review 47 (4).
^ Sommers, The War Against Boys.
^ Rest, James (1979). Development in Judging Moral Issues. University of
Minnesota Press. ISBN 0-8166-0891-1.
^ a b Rest, James; Narvaez, D., Bebeau, M. and Thoma, S. (1999). "DIT-2:
Devising and testing a new instrument of moral judgment". Journal of
Educational Psychology 91 (4): 644-659.
^ Center for the Study of Ethical Development (Website). DIT --Sample Dilemma:
Heinz and the Drug. Retrieved on 2006-12-05.
^ Rest, James; Narvaez, D., Bebeau, M. and Thoma, S. (1999). "A Neo-Kohlbergian
Approach: The DIT and Schema Theory". Educational Psychology Review 11 (4):
291-324.
^ Rest, James; Narvaez, D., Bebeau, M. and Thoma, S. (1999). Postconventional
Moral Thinking: A Neo-Kohlbergian Approach. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum
Associates. ISBN 0-8058-3285-8.
^ Rest, James; Barnett, R., Bebeau, M., Deemer, D., Getz, I., Moon, Y.,
Spickelmeier, J. Thoma, S. and Volker, J (1986). Moral development: Advances in
research and theory. Praeger Publishers. ISBN 0-275-92254-5.
^ Bunch, Wilton H. (2005). "Changing moral judgement in divinity students".
Journal of Moral Education 34 (3): 363-370.
^ Muhlberger, P. (2000). "Moral reasoning effects on political participation".
Political Psychology 21 (4): 667-695.
^ Hedl, John J.; Glazer, H. and Chan, F. (2005). "Improving the Moral Reasoning
of Allied Health Students". Journal of Allied Health 34 (2): 121-122.
[edit]Further reading
Crain, William C. (1985). Theories of Development, 2Rev Ed, Prentice-Hall. ISBN
0-13-913617-7.
Kohlberg, Lawrence (1971). From Is to Ought: How to Commit the Naturalistic
Fallacy and Get Away with It in the Study of Moral Development. Academic Press.
Kohlberg, Lawrence (1973). "The Claim to Moral Adequacy of a Highest Stage of
Moral Judgment". Journal of Philosophy 70: 630-646.
Kohlberg, Lawrence (1981). Essays on Moral Development, Vol. I: The Philosophy
of Moral Development. Harper & Row. ISBN 0-06-064760-4.
Kohlberg, Lawrence; Charles Levine, Alexandra Hewer (1983). Moral stages : a
current formulation and a response to critics. Basel, NY: Karger. ISBN
3-8055-3716-6.
[edit]External links
Moral Development and Moral Education: An Overview
Kohlberg's Moral Stages
Boston Review article covering the topic and other related areas
Kohlberg's Stages of Moral Development
[hide]
v ? d ? e
Human development: biological - psychological
Stages Infancy ? Childhood ? Preadolescence ? Adolescence ? Adulthood - Early
adulthood ? Middle adulthood ? Late adulthood
Development Child development ? Youth development ? Ageing & Senescence
Theorists-theories John Bowlby-attachment ? Erik Erikson-psychosocial ?
Sigmund Freud-psychosexual ? Lawrence Kohlberg-moral ? Jean Piaget-cognitive ?
Lev Vygotsky-cultural-historical
Categories: All articles with unsourced statements | Articles with unsourced
statements since February 2007 | Articles with unsourced statements since
October 2007 | Developmental psychology | Educational psychology | Human
development | Morality | Cognition | Learning | Moral psychology
article discussion edit this page history
Log in / create account
navigation
Main Page
Contents
Featured content
Current events
Random article
interaction
About Wikipedia
Community portal
Recent changes
Contact Wikipedia
Donate to Wikipedia
Help
search
toolbox
What links here
Related changes
Upload file
Special pages
Printable version
Permanent link
Cite this page
languages
?esky
Deutsch
Bahasa Indonesia
??
This page was last modified 17:05, 31 January 2008. All text is available under
the terms of the GNU Free Documentation License. (See Copyrights for details.)
Wikipedia® is a registered trademark of the Wikimedia Foundation, Inc., a U.S.
registered 501(c)(3) tax-deductible nonprofit charity.
Privacy policy About Wikipedia Disclaimers
Enneapsychodramatics
Dr.Joseph M. Pirone 2018033080
On Wednesday, February 06, 2008, at 11:24AM, "Alison Rose Levy"
<LevyAR@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
Joe: Would be interested to know a bit more about Kohlberg¹s levels of
morality? Alison
On 2/6/08 11:13 AM, drjmpirone at drjmpirone@xxxxxxx wrote:
Dipa, trenchant reflections.thanks. It just might be that when we go to the
heart of the matter, we just might find that we can not serve two masters and
that at times service may cost us. Discerning between rendering to Caesar and
rendering to the field may just well be a matter of which fields the laws
serve as the legal system itself may be serving something other than the
larger field.
Service to being with a capital B might just find such laws unlawful on a
different plane. Armenians.American Blacks,Palestinians,Europenan Jews of the
Natzi Era might rapidly understand these words .Kohlbergs levels of morality
5 and 6, like Kant's categorical imperative are another shade of ethics we
just might well ponder. best joseph
Enneapsychodramatics
Dr.Joseph M. Pirone 2018033080
On Wednesday, February 06, 2008, at 09:10AM, "dipa"
<fireflyverdigris@xxxxxxxxx <mailto:fireflyverdigris%40yahoo.com> > wrote:
Hello Judith and all,<mailto:ConstellationTalk%40yahoogroups.com> , Judith <judith.hemming@...>
yes, this is my concern, when things may go 'awry' and clients or
their families question the legitamacy of this work - irregardless of
my intentions of truthfulness, respect and regard for the client and
the work. I am glad to hear that Judith, your open communication with
the client has helped resolve things so far.
I'm also questioning the validity of the confidentiality form that we
sign at the start of most workshops.
Correct me if I'm wrong but I'm guessing that it does not over-ride
the laws of confidentiality in most countries. (at least not in
singapore. if for eg, a client admits to 'recreational drug use' or if
client expresses serious intentions to either harm self or others, the
counsellor/therapist is bound by law to disclose to the appropriate
authorities.
Here lies these grey areas in the ethics code - the subjective
assesment of if the client is for eg, seriously going to attempt
sucide after a workshop, maybe months later (and it may or may not be
related to the work.) I think this is something that we may not know.
then, the question is do I choose to disclose?
I understand that if I choose not to it may happen that if the client
is caught by the law, he/she can turn around and say, "Yes but I told
X facilitator about my intentions." Now there will arise the
consequences for the facilitator/therapist who did not act accordingly
as a proffessional.
Personally and thankfully, I have not heard of any such cases in
constellation work. Where the law has been involved. If there is, I
would be interested to know how the case was dealt with.
I may be overly cautious but I would feel safer with my clients if I
knew the ground that I walked on with regards to the law, esepcially
so when constellation work is not license or recognised as such.
It is beautiful and indeed valid to look at the bigger picture of this
work and ourselves but this will not stand in the court of law and is
anyone or anything above the law?
I think these are important issues to look at and discuss for ourselves.
Some of you may know about code of ethics and law, what are your
feelings and your take with regards to the obligation as a
proffessional to disclosure in constellation work. Do you put the
responsibility and risk upon yourselves?
with warm wishes, Dipa
--- In ConstellationTalk@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
wrote:
about
Hi Dipa,
The code of ethics for a talk site is different from what clients and
constellators may need if things go awry in a workshop.
It may depend on how you are insured and registered, and that will be
specific to you and your situation.
It will also depend on what your clarity of intentions, truthfulness
and whatthe limits of your competence, the the way your workshops are run,
general,is expected to be each person¹s responsibility.
I believe that constellating practitioners must be very ethical in
complaints. And ifbecause the air waves are not buzzing with concerns about
understandingsomeone does complain it must surely be best to offer a space for these
concerns to be talked through until good contact and sincere
occasionally areplace the hurts that may have arisen, however innocent everyone feels.
I have been running constellations for fifteen years and very
part of myclient comes back to me with a criticism. Because my work is not
alwayspractice as a Gestalt practitioner, which would offer formal routes for
complaints, all that is on offer is real conversation, and this has
to thebeen enough to help everyone get back on track. But I do subscribe
Hippocraticcode of ethics that supports my work as a psychotherapist. The
oath may need a little more detail.
I suspect we would not benefit from formalizing our offer too much. Each
person runs things a little differently, and has different emphases and
different strengths.
With best wishes,
Judith
Judith Hemming
Director, movingconstellations
www.movingconstellations.com
judith@...
+44 (0) 207 359 3000
+ 44 (0) 7973 660795
Home address: 79 Ronalds Road, London N5 1XB UK
[Non-text portions of this message have been removed]
